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This paper deals with the issue of the weak growth in Italian labor productiv-
ity with particular reference to the period between 2000 and 2016. In analyz-
ing the data relating to labor productivity, the influence of capital productivi-
ty and multifactor productivity were also considered. The analysis shows how 
the weak growth in labor productivity is due to some peculiar structural as-
pects of the Italian production system. At the end of the paper some com-
ments are offered on possible policy interventions. 
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1. Introduction 
The diseases of the Italian economy can be seen in its high public debt, its low 
GDP growth and its difficulty in respecting the parameters set by the European 
Union [1]. All of this is undoubtedly true. However, Italy’s actual difficulties 
probably arise from a different problem. Italy’s real problem is represented by a 
very low growth in labor, capital and multifactor productivity [2]. 
After the Second World War and up to the early 70s, Italy, like most other 
OECD countries, had a remarkable, rapid growth in productivity, becoming a 
fully-fledged member of those countries having the best potential for develop-
ment. From the 70s onwards, the situation changed radically because of the oil 
shocks. The slowdown in productivity seemed to be much more marked in Italy 
after 1993 than in other countries [3].  
As Paul Krugman said [4], “Productivity isn’t everything but, in the long run, 
it is almost everything.” As many authors claim, read for all the papers the con-
tribute of van Ark et al. [5], since the mid-1990s labor productivity growth in 
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Europe has significantly slowed compared to earlier decades, while in the United 
States accelerated, so that a new productivity gap has opened up. 
In this paper the period between 2000 and 2016 has been analyzed from vari-
ous perspectives. First of all, the dynamics of labor productivity, the only for 
which an international comparison could be made, was analyzed. Next, the 
changes in Italian capital productivity and in what is known as multifactor 
productivity (MFP) were analyzed. Finally, we decided to focus on the compo-
nents of labor productivity, capital deepening and MFP, in order to identify the 
possible causes of the slowdown in Italian labor productivity. After some con-
sideration on the structural causes of this phenomenon, some attempt was made 
to propose possible solutions to the problem. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains an international comparison 
of labor productivity growth and an analysis of the possible consequences on 
unit labor costs and on real wages. Section 3 investigates both the dynamics of 
the capital and multifactor productivity and the components of labor productiv-
ity, still relating Italy to other countries. Section 4 presents some possible causes 
of the poor growth of Italian labor productivity. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Labor Productivity: An International Comparison 
With regard to labor productivity growth1 (Table 1), it can be seen that Italy is 
ranked last amongst OECD countries in the period between 2000 and 2016 [6].  
The two countries with the most marked catching up are Latvia and Lithua-
nia; however, despite having almost doubled their labor productivity, they are 
still very far from achieving the same Italian labor productivity levels. The most 
striking value is undoubtedly that of Ireland, which has almost doubled its labor 
productivity in 16 years, despite starting from values only slightly lower than 
those of Italy [7]. In the period 2000-2016, the average annual growth of labor 
productivity in Italy was definitely lower than that of the EU19 area (15.4%). As 
regards Italy’s major competitors, Germany shows an 18.6% increase and France 
and Spain record labor productivity growth rates of 13.5% and 15.3% respec-
tively, slightly below the Euro area average. Even Greece, with a growth rate 
much lower than the European average (6.5%), has a much better performance 
than Italy, which shows a disastrous growth rate of less than 1%. The National 
Statistics Institute (ISTAT) recently published a report confirming this data 
[8]. 
Some considerations on Unit Labor Costs could be useful to support these 
observations. Unit labor costs (ULCs) measure the average cost of labor per unit 
of output. They are calculated by OECD Stat, as the ratio of total labor costs to 
real output. Annual ULCs can be expressed as the ratio of total labor compensa-
tion per hour worked to output per hour worked (labor productivity).  
 
 
1Labour productivity growth represents a higher level of output for every hour worked. This can be 
achieved if more capital, such as machinery or software or better vintages of it (capital deepening) is 
used in production, or by improving the overall efficiency with which labor and capital are used to-
gether, i.e. higher MFP. In the growth accounting framework, it is possible to decompose labor 
productivity growth into the contribution of capital deepening and multifactor productivity growth. 
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Table 1. Labor productivity (GDP per hour worked, US Dollars, constant prices, 2010 PPPs). Souce: OECD Stat dara and authors’ 
elaborations. 
Time 2000 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 2016 % var. 2000-2016 
Country 
Latvia 14.0 20.5 23.3 21.8 22.6 23.5 24.3 25.1 25.9 26.5 90.1 
Lithuania 15.8 22.0 25.5 25.0 26.5 28.4 29.0 30.4 30.2 29.9 89.8 
Ireland 44.4 51.6 53.0 54.6 62.2 64.9 65.0 67.1 81.0 82.2 85.2 
Korea 18.4 22.9 25.3 27.7 29.3 30.1 30.5 31.8 32.1 32.9 78.9 
Slovak Republic 22.7 28.9 32.9 32.7 34.4 35.0 35.6 37.5 38.5 39.1 71.9 
Estonia 18.0 23.9 27.1 26.6 28.0 27.6 28.8 30.1 29.9 30.8 71.1 
Slovenia 28.0 33.1 36.5 34.1 35.2 36.4 36.2 36.3 36.5 37.4 33.7 
United States 50.0 56.8 58.0 60.3 62.0 62.1 62.3 62.8 63.3 63.5 26.9 
OECD—Total 38.8 42.6 43.9 44.1 44.9 45.3 45.6 46.4 46.9 47.1 21.3 
Austria 44.7 48.6 51.1 50.7 51.5 52.0 52.6 53.1 53.9 53.9 20.6 
Germany 50.6 54.4 56.2 54.9 56.3 57.4 57.8 58.8 59.2 60.0 18.6 
Japan 35.2 38.3 38.7 38.2 39.5 39.6 40.0 40.8 41.4 41.5 18.0 
Finland 43.9 48.8 51.5 48.6 50.2 51.0 50.2 50.5 50.6 51.8 17.9 
United Kingdom 41.3 45.9 47.6 46.5 47.5 47.6 47.4 47.6 48.4 48.1 16.6 
Portugal 27.8 29.3 30.3 30.4 31.4 31.8 32.1 32.2 32.2 32.3 16.2 
Euro area 
(19 countries) 45.9 48.3 49.5 48.9 50.2 50.9 51.3 52.3 52.8 53.0 15.4 
Spain 40.8 41.4 42.1 43.3 44.3 44.9 45.8 46.6 46.9 47.1 15.3 
Belgium 56.8 61.1 62.6 61.8 63.2 62.9 62.7 63.8 64.5 64.6 13.7 
Netherlands 54.8 58.8 60.2 58.9 60.1 60.6 60.5 61.3 62.1 62.3 13.6 
France 51.9 55.8 56.8 55.8 56.5 57.0 57.1 58.5 58.9 58.9 13.5 
Greece 29.0 32.1 34.3 33.0 33.0 31.9 31.3 31.6 31.0 30.8 6.5 
Luxembourg 78.7 80.7 84.0 77.4 79.7 79.4 77.6 80.5 81.1 80.7 2.5 
Italy 47.3 47.5 47.5 46.2 47.2 47.4 47.3 47.8 47.9 47.7 0.9 
 
The dynamics of Unit Labor Costs in the Eurozone since 2000 have been 
widely divergent: in Germany the ULCs increased slightly (thanks also to the 
2004 Hartz reform [9] of the labor market which maximized mini-jobs), whilst it 
grew strongly in all Eurozone countries (Figure 1).  
In Germany, although the overall cuts in hours for workers were consistent 
with the severity of the Great Recession, reduction of working time account bal-
ances substituted for traditional government-sponsored short-time work. The 
situation in Greece is worthy of note: ULCs grew significantly until 2009 and 
then continuously decreased, particularly in the period between 2011 and 2014. 
The trend in Spain is similar to that of Greece. In both these countries, therefore, 
there seems to have been a more immediate response on the labor market due to 
the greater impact of the international crisis. In all the other main Euro area 
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countries, and in the United States, Unit Labour Costs have instead continued to 
increase. The dynamics of ULCs in Japan have been completely different: they 
have been decreasing steadily since 2000.  
In Italy, ULCs have been steadily increasing (+39.5%) and to a greater extent 
than in the other countries considered. This higher ULCs growth in Italy could 
be easily understood if we compare this data with that relating to the changes in 
the Italian nominal wage from 2000 to 2016 (Figure 2). The trend in ULCs is in 
fact the result of the both the trend in the labor compensation per hour worked 
and in labor productivity.  
As can be seen from Figure 2, the increase in ULCs in Italy is due to a con-
stant growth in labor compensation per hour worked (+40.2%), which is not ac-
companied by an adequate increase in labor productivity (+0.9%). 
Next, the relationship between labor productivity and real wages should be 
considered.  
Figure 3 shows the percentage change in labor productivity and the percen-
tage change in real wages for different countries in the period between 2000 and 
2016. In general, real wage growth is closely and positively related to labor 
productivity. If we look at the Italian situation, we can see that in Italy a low 
growth in labor productivity has essentially been associated with a low growth in 
real wages. This figure is even more significant when we compare Italy to the 
United States, where high increases in labor productivity have been associated 
with high increases in real wages. Situations similar to that of the United States 
are also evident for Italy’s main European competitors (Germany, France, Spain 
and the UK). 
As regards the changes in real wages, OECD data shows that the effects of the 
economic crisis appear to have hit some European countries more than others. 
In the case of Greece, which has particularly suffered from the international cri-
sis due to an already serious internal situation, real wages have fallen dramati-
cally since 2009 and the same is true in Spain.  
 
 
Figure 1. Unit Labor Costs Index (average cost of labor per unit of output, 2000-2016). 
Souce: authors’ elaborations on OECD data. 
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Figure 2. The evolution of ULCs and its components. Italian situationn 2000-2016. 
Souce: authors’ elaborations on OECD Stat data. 
 
 
Figure 3. Labor productivity and real wage % (2000-2016). Souce: authors’ elaborations 
on OECD Stat data. 
 
A similar slight decline in real wages can be observed both in the United 
Kingdom and, just more marked, in Italy. Peculiar and unusual is the case of 
France, but above all of Germany and the USA: in these countries, despite the 
international crisis, real wages are continuing to grow together with a strong in-
crease in labor productivity. This shows that where labor productivity grows in-
tensely and continuously, the economic crisis has no impact on real wages, 
which already tend to be rigid downwards. Real wages are thus proving to be a 
structural rather than a cyclical variable. 
All of the above is also supported when we look at the inflation trend: in Italy, 
nominal wages are growing in parallel with inflation, whilst real wages and labor 
productivity, as it has been seen, are actually remaining constant. In France, the 
increase in labor productivity was almost entirely passed on to the workers who 
received higher nominal, but also higher real, wages. Germany, instead, had a 
different policy: in this case, the increase in labor productivity was only partially 
reflected in an increase in real wages. The increased productivity was not entire-
ly passed on the workers but, instead, mostly benefitted the German firms, 
which were thus able to gain ground in terms of competitiveness. 
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In other words, countries with lower growth in labor productivity tend, on the 
one hand, to have lower growth in real wages and therefore in domestic demand 
and, on the other hand, to have higher growth in ULCs. And this would proba-
bly have negative consequences as regards their foreign demand. Lower labor 
productivity therefore leads to lower growth in aggregate demand and, conse-
quently, lower economic growth. 
3. From Capital Productivity to the Components of Labor  
Productivity 
As regards capital productivity, by contrast,2 the situation of the various coun-
tries considered appears to be characterized by a collective decline since 2000, 
with marked drops in the period between 2007 and 2009 (Figure 4).  
From 2009 onwards, the situation ceases to be homogeneous. Germany and 
Japan show a considerable increase in capital productivity, which substantially 
returns to the levels prior to the international crisis. The USA and the United 
Kingdom stabilize after the 2007-2009 setback. Spain shows a continuous and 
striking decrease in capital productivity (data are available until 2015) and this 
decrease is likewise recorded in France, albeit to a much lesser extent. As for Ita-
ly, there is a constant, marked drop in capital productivity until 2013, although 
there is a modest recovery in the last three years considered.  
What is striking, however, is that, with the exception of Germany and Japan,  
 
 




2Capital productivity shows how efficiently capital is used to generate output. It reflects the joint in-
fluence of labor input per unit of capital used and multifactor productivity (MFP); the latter reflect-
ing the overall efficiency of production. Capital productivity is measured as the ratio between the 
volume of output (GDP), and the volume of capital input, defined as the flow of productive services 
that capital delivers in production, i.e. capital services. These services are estimated by the OECD 
using the rate of change of the productive capital stock, which takes into account wear and tear, re-
tirements and other sources of reduction in the productive capacity of fixed capital assets. To ensure 
comparability across countries, the OECD capital services measures are based on a common com-
putation method for all countries. See [10].  
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capital productivity shows a strong tendency to reduce. This situation is proba-
bly the result of the increased use of capital input (ICT and non-ICT) which 
leads to a reduction in capital productivity, reduction that has been particularly 
accentuated by the international crisis and, probably, by a gradually increasing 
rigidity in output with respect to the use of this input. 
With particular reference to the Italian situation (Figure 5), it can be seen that 
the reduction in capital productivity is the result of both the steady increase in 
total capital services3 and the poor growth in GDP. The increase in Italian total 
capital services was in line with that in Germany (+27.5% in Italy and +26.2% in 
Germany), but decidedly lower than in Spain (+82%), the USA (+55%), the 
United Kingdom (+48%) and France (+47%).  
However, the composition of total capital services is worth a mention. It in-
cludes both ICT capital (computer hardware, telecommunications equipment, 
computer software and databases) and non-ICT capital (transport equipment, other 
machinery and equipment and weapons systems, non-residential construction, 
research and development and other intellectual property products). In all the 
countries considered in the analysis, the greatest change in total capital services 
was that in ICT capital. This data provides clear evidence of technological 
change and its ongoing transformation and reflects the impact of what is com-
monly referred to as the “fourth industrial revolution”. This is particularly evi-
dent if one considers that the increase in ICT capital was greater in Germany 
(+190%), i.e. precisely where the first steps in the industrial response (Industry 
4.0) to the fourth revolution were taken.  
The third productivity to be considered is the total factor (multifactor) prod-
uctivity. Growth in multifactor productivity (MFP) “is measured as a residual, 
e.g. that part of GDP growth that cannot be explained by growth in labor and 
capital inputs. Traditionally, MFP growth is seen as capturing technological 
progress but, in practice, this interpretation needs some caution. First, some part 
of technological change is embodied in capital input, e.g. improvements in de-
sign and quality between two vintages of the same capital asset, and so its effects 
on GDP growth are attributed to the respective factor. MFP only picks up dis-
embodied technical change, e.g. network effects or spillovers from production 
factors, the effects of better management practices, brand names, organizational 
change and general knowledge. Second, data and resource constraints hamper a 
 
 
3For productivity analysis, the preferred measure of capital input is the flow of productive services 
that can be drawn from the cumulative stock of past investments. These services are estimated by the 
OECD using the rate of change of the productive capital stock, which takes into account wear and 
tear, retirements and other sources of reduction in the productive capacity of fixed capital assets. 
The price of capital services per asset is measured as their rental price. In principle, the latter could 
be directly observed if markets existed for all capital services. In practice, however, rental prices have 
to be imputed for most assets, using the implicit rent that capital goods’ owners “pay” to themselves 
(or the user costs of capital). Estimates of capital services in the OECD Productivity Database can be 
broken down by eight types of assets: computer hardware, telecommunications equipment, trans-
port equipment, other machinery and equipment and weapons systems, non-residential construc-
tion, computer software and databases, research and development and other intellectual property 
products. To ensure comparability across countries, the OECD capital services measures are based 
on a common computation method for all countries. See [10]. 
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precise measurement of labor and capital input, affecting MFP. Moreover, MFP 
also captures other factors such as adjustment costs, economies of scale and ef-
fects from imperfect competition.” [11] 
As can be seen from Figure 6, with the exception of Spain and Italy, MFP in-
creased significantly in all the countries considered, with peaks of 15% in the 
USA and 11% in Germany. In Italy, however, MFP has actually decreased (–6%) 
since 2000 [12] [13]. This data must be seen in relation with the poor Italian la-
bor productivity growth. In fact, MFP, together with capital deepening, is one of 
the determinants of labor productivity. In the Solow growth accounting model 
[14], there is a close link between changes in labor productivity and MFP. If we 
assume that labor input corresponds to the total hours worked (disregarding the 
change in composition of the labor force), it follows that the rate of growth in 
the value added per hour worked (i.e., the rate of growth in labor productivity) is 
equal to the sum of the rate of growth in capital input per hour worked (capital 
deepening) and the rate of growth in MFP (which in this model coincides with 
technological progress) [8].  
 
 
Figure 5. Capital productivity, Total Capital Services and GDP Indexes. Italian situation 
200-2016. Source: authors’ elaborations on OECD Star data. 
 
 
Figure 6. Miltifactor Productivity Index 2000-2016. Source: authors’ elaborations on 
OECD Stat data. 
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Capital deepening, or the capital intensity index (Figure 7), shows a more or 
less evident increase for all the countries considered until 2013. The figure for 
Spain is noteworthy as it shows a frenetic growth until 2014. Once more, we can 
note that the international crisis caused a setback even in the capital deepening 
growth process in all countries. 
However, the Italian situation is different. After the characteristic growth seen 
in all countries, Italy is the only one to have recorded a drop since 2013 and this 
decrease became more significant from 2015 onward. This fact is already impli-
cit from the trend in total capital services (Figure 5). Capital deepening is in-
evitably affected by the effect of spending on research and development (R&D) 
and technological innovation, and this could be a valid reason for the different 
performance of the changes in Italian capital deepening compared to other 
countries.  
Figure 8 shows the overall situation of the change in labor productivity in Italy  
 
 
Figure 7. Capital Deepening Index 2000-2016. Source: authors’ elaborations on 
OECD Stat data. 
 
 
Figure 8. The evolution of labor productivity and its components. Italian situation 
2000-2016. Source: authors’ elaborations on OECD Stat data. 
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when its two components (capital deepening and multifactor productivity) are 
considered too.  
It is clear that the change in Italian labor productivity is strongly influenced by 
the trend in MFP, while the trend in capital deepening has little effect. As capital 
deepening indicates an intensification in the use of capital-intensive techniques 
(and not simply a widening of capital stock), it can be argued that the Italian 
production structure, which is characterized by small and medium sized firms, 
did not allow an adequate use of the various types of capital. Added to this is the 
fact that the small size of the average Italian firm actually prevents adequate 
R&D investments, which could have a positive impact on multifactor productiv-
ity.  
Besides, the effect of the interest rates reduction definitely had a lower im-
pact in Italy than in other countries because of the high burden of its public 
debt. There has been less, and probably poorer, investment. In addition, 
small-medium sized Italian firms have greater difficulty accessing credit on the 
financial markets.  
If we also look at Figure 9, we can immediately see that Italian labor produc-
tivity growth has been characterized by a low ICT capital deepening component 
(in fact, it has actually reduced over time) and by a multifactor productivity 
component which has actually been negative in some years.  
4. An Analysis of the Possible Causes of the Poor Growth in  
Italian Labor Productivity 
The analysis shows that from 2000 to 2016 Italy recorded a very weak growth in 
labor productivity, especially when compared with that of its main competitors. 
It is also obvious that this situation is the result, on the one hand, of lower ICT 
capital and mainly, on the other hand, and in contrast to other countries, of a 
reduction in multifactor productivity.  
The structure of Italy’s comparative advantages highlights the fact that this 
still predominantly manufacturing country has an atypical international produc-
tion specialization compared to the other highly industrialized Western coun-
tries. In fact, it is oriented towards traditional sectors4 (leather goods and foot-
wear, textiles, clothing, furnishings and furniture). These typical “made in Italy” 
sectors are unskilled-labor-intensive and low-technology-based. This means that 
labor productivity is in itself low and has less potential for growth. These cha-
racteristics have inevitably had an influence on the low use of ICT technologies 
[15] [16].  
On the other hand, if we exclude the specialized mechanical sector (machinery 
and mechanical equipment), the Italian manufacturing production structure is 
 
 
4However, since the 1990s a weakening in the international specialisation of the Italy in these sectors 
has been observed due to competition from emerging countries, which have a high degree of specia-
lisation in these same sectors. This trend continued in the following decade and in the years of the 
great international economic crisis. 
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very weak in the scale-intensive, skilled-labor-intensive and high-technology- 
based sectors. These sectors traditionally have higher labor productivity because 
they are more R&D and capital intensive, with a higher potential for the use of 
new ICT technologies. Only in recent years it has been possible to observe a re-
duction in the Italian comparative disadvantages in some of these sectors; sec-
tors which feature strong economies of scale and high R&D intensity (pharma-
ceuticals, aircraft and spacecraft). 
The Italian model of production specialization is closely linked with the aver-
age size of Italian firms. As it has in fact already been mentioned, Italian firms 
are mainly small and medium-sized: in 2016 approximately 99% of Italian firms 
had less than 50 employees. This is not insignificant when we consider that this 
figure represents 66% of Italian employment in the private sector and over 50% 
of the added value [17]. The small size of Italian firms does not allow economies 
of scale to be exploited and for many years the focus of policy makers has been 
directed on the possibility of overcoming this limitation by promoting the crea-
tion of industrial districts. On the other hand, small and medium-sized Italian 
firms have struggled, and are continuing to struggle, to access credit on the fi-
nancial markets, thus obtaining less investment opportunities. They have thus 
suffered further from the credit crunch generated by the international economic 
crisis.  
A further element is added to all the above. In countries which, like Italy, are 
characterized by a manufacturing-type production structure, there has been a 
considerable development in the advanced producer services sector. This sector 
is skilled-labor-intensive and therefore has a high use of human capital and ICT 
technologies. However, in Italy this crucial sector has not been developing with 
the same intensity.  
Moreover, in Italy the percentage of graduates amongst people aged between 
25 and 34 is still very low (27%) if compared to the OECD average (44%) and the 
percentage of Italian graduates with scientific skills is equally poor [18].  
This has inevitable negative consequences on Italian human capital and has a 
negative effect on its R&D activity.  
 
 
Figure 9. Italy, percentage point contribution to labor productivity growth, annual, 
2000-2016. Source: authors’ elaborations on OECD Stat data. 
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Such activity is undoubtedly low in Italy compared to the major industrialized 
countries and is, moreover, mainly focused on “basic research”. In addition, this 
R&D is mainly undertaken with public funding, once again because of the small 
size of Italian firms.  
Last but not least, the efficiency of the Italian system must be considered. The 
World Bank’s Doing Business [19] reports have long underlined the difficulties 
of “doing business” in Italy. Despite an improvement in performance compared 
to previous years, the World Bank positions Italy in 46th place out of 190 as re-
gards the ease of doing business. However, this puts Italy in last places amongst 
OECD countries. Although, on the one hand, Italy performs well in the trading 
across borders rank (time and cost to export the product of comparative advan-
tage and import auto parts), in the registering property rank (procedures, time 
and cost to transfer a property and the quality of the land administration sys-
tem), and in the resolving insolvency rank (time, cost, outcome and recovery 
rate for a commercial insolvency and the strength of the legal framework for in-
solvency), the same cannot be said for other indicators. In particular, Italy is in 
position 105 in the getting credit rank (movable collateral laws and credit infor-
mation systems), in position 108 in the enforcing of contracts rank (time and 
cost to resolve a commercial dispute and the quality of judicial processes), and in 
position 112 in the paying taxes rank (payments, time and total tax and contri-
bution rate as a result of all tax regulations as well as post-filing processes).  
This result highlights the Italian Public Administration’s lack of efficiency 
and, as regards the getting credit rank, the difficulties firms have in obtaining the 
necessary financing for the flow of investments which guarantee competitive-
ness. Naturally, this last data confirms the previously statements and contributes 
to the generation of a climate of substantial distrust amongst foreign investors as 
regards Italy.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper certainly deserves further insights but some preliminary observations 
can already be made. 
The problem of productivity is undoubtedly one of the most debated issues in 
the economic, political and social world. The Italian situation is an interesting 
“workshop” for analysis and proposals of possible solutions. What is obvious is 
that multifactor productivity must be stimulated as growth in production sys-
tems is greatly reliant upon it. In reality, even though it may seem like an easy 
problem to solve, the actual definition of multifactor productivity demands 
complex reflections about its various components. One possible way forward 
could be to identify the sectors in which the effect of technology and human 
capital appear to be more relevant. In Italy the mechanical, chemical and manu-
facturing sectors in general could be the most fertile areas for work. An increase 
in R&D investment in these sectors could, together with a decided and informed 
reform of the education sector, already guarantee results in the medium term.  
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It also appears urgent to add to this an equally informed and committed digi-
talization of public administration which would allow the public sector to be 
more efficient with positive consequences for the private sector.  
Naturally, in order to increase productivity it is also necessary to intervene on 
the demand side, especially given the certainty that real wages, closely linked to 
labor productivity and held fixed by the stagnation in demand, end up depress-
ing the need to replace labor with capital. In other words, the way forward is to 
invest in ICT capital. However, doing so requires a farsighted credit and finan-
cial sector which once more believes, and therefore invests, in the production 
system and so embraces the collective interest and abandons individual interests. 
Nevertheless, this is not enough. The second essential pillar is human capital. 
It is more than ever urgent and important to invest in training and in education 
in order to deal positively with the consequences of the fourth industrial revolu-
tion.  
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